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M E E T T H E P R E S S

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Produced by LAWRENCE E. SPIVAK

Guest: ALLEN W. DULLES
Former Director, Central Intelligence Agency

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Panel: WALLACE CARROLL, *The New York Times*
RICHARD HARKNESS, *NBC News*
JOHN STEELE, *Time & Life Magazines*
LAWRENCE E. SPIVAK, *Permanent Panel Member*

Moderator: BYRSON RASH, *NBC News*

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M E E T T H E P R E S S

MR. RASH: This is Bryson Rash, substituting for Ned Brooks, and inviting you to MEET THE PRESS:

Our guest today is Mr. Allen W. Dulles, the Director of the CIA from 1953 until he resigned just a few weeks ago. He has the unique record of having served the United States under 8 Presidents beginning with Mr. Woodrow Wilson.

Now, here is the first question from Mr. Lawrence E. Spivak, permanent member of the MEET THE PRESS panel.

MR. SPIVAK: Mr. Dulles, you have often been called America's master spy and the CIA, America's master spy organization. Can you tell us how important undercover activity is today in intelligence operations?

MR. DULLES: I think I would rather be called America's chief intelligence officer, as I was for a time until I resigned a little while ago. I am rather inclined to think that because of the appeal everything to do with espionage has that it tends to overweigh other sides of the work of the CIA. The end item, the end product of CIA is these estimates and these appraisals that we give to the policy makers. The job of CIA, its biggest job, is to pull together all the intelligence that comes from all parts of the world, comes through all channels, the various other agencies of government such as State Department, Defense Department, that collect intelligence—and from others—and then add to it its own product and then try, with the best analysts, the best students that we can get, to pull together a final product in conjunction with the other intelligence agencies of government, so that our policy makers, the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, have a solid basis for reaching their conclusions on which our policy is made.

MR. SPIVAK: It is true, isn't it, there was a time when intelligence activities were largely spy operations? Have these techniques changed in recent years?

MR. DULLES: Yes, Mr. Spivak, they have changed. As science has made these tremendous strides forward, scientific methods are very much competing with the human methods, I might call them, and we get a great deal of intelligence through the most sophisticated methods of science, today. We haven't given up the other. The other side is very important, and you can't get along without the human element, but the scientific element has come forward very rapidly.

MR. SPIVAK: Do you expect that in our lifetime, for example, something like spy satellites will take the place of most of our undercover work?

MR. DULLES: I would doubt that.

MR. SPIVAK: Mr. Dulles, The Soviet Union during the past year or so has arrested a great many so-called "Western spies." Is there some special explanation for this?

MR. DULLES: I would say that anybody who goes to the Soviet Union, even under the most innocent circumstances and tries to get information about what is going on there is prima facie viewed as a spy. We just consider that—I mean, in this country if anybody comes over here and wants to get information, it is all wide open and we give it to them.

In Russia, a great many things are classified, and a great many people therefore are picked up who are utterly and completely innocent. However, once in a while they get spies, too.

MR. SPIVAK: This has always been true, but they seem to have arrested a great many more people recently whom they call spies. Is this due to the fact that the Western nations have increased their activity inside the Soviet Union, or are the Soviet Union officials just picking up more people?

MR. DULLES: I think they are more sensitive. The security that the Soviet tries to protect in great parts of the whole Soviet Union, that security area is so dear to them, such a great part of their whole system of national defense—and is becoming more so as their scientific weapons come into play.

MR. SPIVAK: I know it is very difficult for us to get information, secret information out of the Soviet Union, but how hard is it for our enemies to learn what they want in an open society like ours?

MR. DULLES. It is very much easier, Mr. Spivak, obviously. They can read the press. They can watch television shows. They

can read the Congressional Record. They can read the mass of material that we are putting out all the time. Papers that are issued by the Defense Department, presentations for budgets, all of that is grist to their mill. In a free society you can't prevent that.

MR. SPIVAK: Are you however, able to get what information you need in order to make the estimates that you do make from a closed society?

MR. DULLES: I would like to get a lot more.

MR. SPIVAK: But you do all right now?

MR. DULLES: I don't think in intelligence you ought to ever say you do all right. We are doing better, I think, each year.

MR. CARROLL: Mr. Dulles, at the Communist Party Congress in Moscow last month some of the disagreements between the Soviets and the Communist Chinese came into the open. You have had an exceptional opportunity to study the relationships between these two countries. How deep do you think these disagreements are, and what are the underlying causes?

MR. DULLES: Mr. Carroll, I think these differences run very deep. However, I do not think we should delude ourselves by thinking that they run so deeply that there is likely to be an open split between Moscow and Peiping. The basic difference, as you know well, is the difference in approach to their master program of taking over the world. Khrushchev, having repudiated Stalin and Stalinism, now says it ought to be done under the guise of co-existence—that is, we can take over the world peacefully. The doctrine of Stalin, the doctrine of Mao is to the general effect that that is not possible. You've got to be more aggressive; you've got to be more vigorous; you've got to be more ready to use military force, locally at least. This is quite a vital difference, and Khrushchev doesn't like it because it affects the image he is trying to create.

I do not think though that we should beguile ourselves by believing that the basic goal of Moscow is any different from the basic goal of Peiping or vice versa. They both believe that Communism is going to take over the world.

Khrushchev has been very anxious to show that Lenin was a co-existencist, that is, that he believed in the doctrine of co-existence.

Molotov wrote a rather interesting letter that was referred to,

as you may have seen, in the proceedings, of the 22nd Party Congress. We haven't got the copy of it, and some day that copy is going to turn up, though.

MR. CARROLL: Why do you suppose Mr. Khrushchev chose this moment to take open issue with the Chinese Communists? Are they particularly vulnerable to pressure from the Soviets at this time?

MR. DULLES: This goes back, you see quite a way. It really goes back to the meeting a year ago last June, I believe it was, in Bucharest. The open breach between the two started at that time and then was carried through the Party Congress that was held in November of 1961, so that what we have today in the 22nd Party Congress is really a reflection of what has been going on for many, many months and many years, really, that came into the open.

MR. STEELE: Mr. Dulles, some critics of the Central Intelligence Agency insist that it is too powerful, that in some cases it has worked against American foreign policy and that it is, in short, a meddler. What answer do you have to this type of criticism?

MR. DULLES: I know well of that criticism. I can say, however, that no actions have been taken in the political field by CIA over the years that have not had basic policy approval.

That does not mean that everything we are alleged to have done has been done and hence had any policy approval. Every time anything happens anywhere in the world, the Kremlin, if it sees any advantage in it, says that we have done it, and that has been their policy right along.

MR. STEELE: You have been also a favorite whipping boy on the part of Moscow. Do you think that is a token to your agency's effectiveness?

MR. DULLES: Yes, I think it is. I haven't any doubt whatever that Moscow has been trying to destroy this agency for many, many years—the CIA.

MR. STEELE: There has been a slightly different kind of criticism, and it is based on broader grounds. It is suggested that clandestine underground operations really have no place in our kind of a democratic society. How do you feel about this?

MR. DULLES: If the entire world was a democratic society like ours, I would agree, but when we have a vigorous, vicious

opponent that is using these methods, it is sometimes said, you have to fight fire with fire, whether you like it or not.

MR. HARKNESS: Mr. Dulles, this question touches on the edge of the U-2 flights. Back in '59 and through '60 we had a lot of talk about a missile gap. I think figures that were probably "in the ball park" said that by mid-1961 Russia would have, on launching pads, upwards of 200 inter-continental missiles and we would have in the middle of '61, 54. The Republican Secretary of Defense, Mr. Gates, denied that missile gap, and he has been backed up by the Democratic Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara. Did the U-2 flights let you look down the Russian throats and know the real state of their missile preparedness, and do you say there is a missile gap now?

MR. DULLES: That is a kind of a complicated question, Mr. Harkness, and I will do my best to answer it. We have never given out any figures obviously. We don't do that. Further, in the Central Intelligence Agency we do not make what you might call net appraisals. It is not our job to appraise a net position between ourselves the United States and the Soviet Union. That has to be done by others, particularly by the Defense Department. It is our job to try to present as clear a picture to the policy makers of where we think the Soviet Union is in all of these fields, including the missile field. And I will say myself that it is fair to assume that they have had their problems in the missile field as well as others—as well as ourselves. It is not up to me to say whether there is or is not a missile gap, but I think it is fair to say that in certain fields they have not made the progress in missiles that we thought they might be able to make some years ago.

MR. HARKNESS: Mr. Dulles, there is a new book out which purports to tell the inside story of CIA. It says, for instance, that in Germany you trusted an ex-Nazi to tell you pretty much everything you wanted to know about the Russian operation in Europe. It said that you aided and abetted the 1953 uprising in East Germany, and it says—this is a direct quote, that you "gave aid and counsel to the Hungarian Freedom Fighters in advance." Do you have any comment on such material as that?

MR. DULLES: I have glanced over the book to which you refer. I would not call it the inside story of the CIA, I would call it the "up-side-down" story of the CIA, if I had to appraise it quickly. I regret to say there are a great number of inaccuracies and a good deal of material which has been pulled from far-leftist sources, which I think should not have been in the book.

MR. HARKNESS: You say "far-leftist sources." Would you say perhaps they have fallen for some Communist propaganda? Would you go that far?

MR. DULLES: The Communists have tried to sell their propaganda, and unfortunately they have succeeded in many cases. They have placed their propaganda—first it comes out in their own publications and radio and other ways, then it is picked up by leftist journals and then it gets more and more respectability until you find people quoting Communist propaganda, sometimes maybe without knowing what they are doing.

MR. SPIVAK: Mr. Dulles, one of the CIA's jobs is to interpret capabilities and intentions on which foreign governments operate, isn't that true?

MR. DULLES: That is correct, yes.

MR. SPIVAK: Can you tell us now what you see as the Soviet intentions in 1962?

MR. DULLES: I feel quite clear as to Soviet intentions over the longer run than 1962. As I have said before, the Soviet program is to try to take us over, and Khrushchev has indicated that very clearly, Mr. Spivak.

As to the shorter run, you are all very well familiar with the areas of crisis. We have Berlin, we have Laos, we have South Viet Nam, we have the Congo, and we have a good many others I could mention. I believe that they will continue to keep up the pressure in Berlin, and then they will try to attack us on the flanks, particularly—Laos and South Viet Nam and other areas far distant from us. Berlin will be the focus point, and the other areas may well be the areas where they will try to make the immediate progress.

MR. SPIVAK: You say they haven't changed their intentions any. Their long-run intention remains the same, and that is to take us over?

MR. DULLES: That is my view.

MR. SPIVAK: Do they want to take us over physically, or do they just want to destroy our power? Do you think they are stupid enough to believe they can conquer this country and hold it and run it, or do they just want to destroy our power?

MR. DULLES: By "take over" I mean, as Khrushchev has clearly said, he believes that our grandchildren will live under a

Communist system. I don't mean that they are going to march in with armies. I believe they feel that they can work about a change in our system so that, as he indicated, we will adopt a Communist system and like it.

MR. SPIVAK: Can you tell us how you see their military capabilities at the present time for 1962? There was a time you know when a great many people said by 1962 we would be in serious trouble. What are their capabilities for the immediate future, in your judgment?

MR. DULLES: They are a very strong military power. It is not my view that they intend to precipitate general war because I think as they have themselves said that that would mean mutual destruction. They are strong on the ground. They have the great land mass from which they could use their military forces. They are highly sophisticated as we must realize in missiles, and they are highly sophisticated in the nuclear field. This last test, which was concluded just before I retired, showed that they had made, certainly, a leap forward in their capability in the nuclear field.

MR. SPIVAK: If their intentions are to destroy us, how is this thing going to end, can we ever live in real peace with them, or must one system or the other, in your judgment, be destroyed?

MR. DULLES: I think there is hope. I think that with education, if you could get more of an opening up of the Soviet Union, that the Russian people—I don't think the Russian people have the ambitions that Krushchev himself has. I think it is quite possible—it is going to take a long while, it may take decades—but it is not impossible that the Russian people themselves would force a change in the worldwide ambitions of the Soviet Union.

MR. CARROLL: Mr. Dulles, last spring many officials here in Washington were worried about the spread of Castroism, the influence of Premier Castro in Latin America. That indeed was supposed to have been one of the reasons why you and others felt we had to make an attempt to overthrow Castro in Cuba. Has Castro's influence in Latin America grown in the meantime, or was that a miscalculation?

MR. DULLES: I think that Latin America is far more alerted to the danger of Castroism and communism as a danger to their system than they were let's say a year ago or last April. Many countries in Latin America have now broken diplomatic relations with Cuba, and I think therefore the impact of Castroism has

decreased in many Latin American countries over the last six months because of their understanding of what has taken place in Cuba and their apprehension of what might take place in their own countries.

MR. CARROLL: Is it true that the Chinese Communists are very active in Latin America in propaganda against this country?

MR. DULLES: They are quite active, yes.

MR. CARROLL: Do you have evidence?

MR. DULLES: We have some evidence of that, and they are also fairly active in Africa.

MR. STEELE: Mr. Dulles, I want to ask you very frankly whether the failure in Cuba was an intelligence failure?

MR. DULLES: I don't think it was, Mr. Steele. There was no military hardware that appeared that was a surprise to us. Some of the material was handled a little better than we had expected. There is quite a general popular misapprehension that it was felt that there would be a spontaneous uprising. We had never contemplated that. In the days of the war I worked a great deal with the French underground; the last thing we wanted was spontaneous uprisings to get slaughtered by the Nazi troops. In the same way we were not looking for a spontaneous uprising, but for other developments.

MR. STEELE: Did we anticipate the appearance of Castro's jets and also the inability of those who reached the beach to get to the mountains when the major objective failed? Were these two things foreseen?

MR. DULLES: There we are getting into areas about which I have not done any talking, and I don't think I will start now. Obviously the air situation was a very important element in the whole picture.

MR. STEELE: Mr. Dulles, was the abortive invasion attempt more or less inevitable, and did it have perhaps any long-range results on the plus side?

MR. DULLES: Looking back at it, Mr. Steele, sort of from the background of history, or as history will look at it, I think the historians of the future will probably say that if any move was to be made to get rid of communism in Cuba short of actual military intervention with all the power of the United States that effort would probably have to have been made sometime between, say, November and April.

MR. HARKNESS: On Cuba, Mr. Dulles, I heard after the invasion a military expert say that that invasion was the last chance to overthrow Castro without direct United States intervention. Do you agree with that?

MR. DULLES: I wouldn't go quite that far, but I would go well along the line. We knew, as I was just going to say in answer to Mr. Steele, we knew that the Cuban pilots were being trained in Czechoslovakia. We knew they were going to have very shortly available under Cuban direction MIG's in considerable numbers, and I am inclined to think, as I said before, that if a move were to be made short of intervention, probably this was the area of time when it had to be made, about November to April.

MR. HARKNESS: Mr. Dulles, you have to acknowledge your mistakes but you can't boast about your accomplishments in the CIA field. How do you evaluate U.S. intelligence vis-a-vis, say, the Russians and the British?

MR. DULLES: I think we have a very competent intelligence. I think it has been growing. We have a devoted body of men and women working there. They have worked there for many years. They are now becoming highly competent. We are getting some of the ablest young men in the United States to join with us, and I think we have one of the best intelligence services in the world. In the counter-intelligence field we have been doing extremely well this last year.

MR. SPIVAK: From time to time it has been suggested that Congress set up a joint watchdog committee over the CIA. What is your opinion of the value and the disadvantages of such a committee?

MR. DULLES: I think the situation as it now exists is pretty good. We have committees, you know. The idea that we are not looked at by Congress is a fantasy. I appeared before a subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee—when I was Director—and a subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee any time they wanted. Those two committees know about all our work, all our activities. We bar no information from them that they want.

MR. RASH: Gentlemen, I am sorry, but I am going to have to suspend our questions at this time. Thank you very much, Mr. Dulles, for being with us.

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MR. SPIVAK: Mr. Dulles, you have often been called America's master spy, and the CIA, America's master spy organization.

Can you tell us how important undercover activity is today in intelligence operations?

MR. DULLES: Mr. Spivak, I think I would rather be called America's chief intelligence officer, as I was for a time until I resigned a little while ago. I am rather inclined to think, because of the appeal everything to do with espionage has, that tends to overweight other sides of the work of the CIA. The end item, the end product of CIA are these estimates and these appraisals that we give to the policy makers. The job of CIA, its biggest job, is to pull together all the intelligence that comes from all parts of the world, comes through all channels, the various other agencies of government such as State Department, Defense Department, that collect intelligence and from others, and then add to it its own product and then try, with the best analysts, the best students that we can get, to pull together a final product in conjunction with the other intelligence agencies of government so that our policy makers, the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, have a solid basis for reaching their conclusions on which our policy is made.

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Now, we haven't given up the other. The other side is very important, and you can't get along without the human element, but the scientific element has come forward very rapidly.

MR. SPIVAK: Do you feel that in our lifetime, for example, something like spy satellites will take the place of most of our undercover work?

MR. DULLES: I would doubt that.

MR. SPIVAK: Mr. Dulles, the Soviet Union during the past year or so has arrested a great many so-called "Western spies." Is there some special explanation for this?

MR. DULLES: Well, Mr. Spivak, I would say that anybody who goes to the Soviet Union, even under the most innocent circumstances and tries to get information about what is going on there, he is prima facie viewed as a spy. We just consider that -- I mean in this country if anybody comes over here and wants to get information, it is all wide open and we give it to them.

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MR. DULLES: Well, I think they are more sensitive. The security that the Soviet tries to protect in great parts of the whole Soviet Union, that security area is so dear to them, such a great part of their whole system of national defense, and is becoming more so as their scientific weapons come into play.

MR. SPIVAK: I know it is very difficult for us to get information, secret information out of the Soviet Union, but how hard is it for our enemies to learn what they want in an open society like ours?

MR. DULLES: Well it is very much easier, Mr. Spivak, obviously.

They can read the press. They can watch television shows. They can read the Congressional Record. They can read the mass of material that we are putting out all the time. Papers that are issued by the Defense Department; presentations for budgets; all of that is grist to their mill. Now in a free society you can't prevent that.

MR. SPIVAK: Are you however, able to get what information you need in order to make the estimates that you do make from a closed society?

MR. DULLES: Well, I would like to get a lot more.

MR. SPIVAK: But you do all right now?

MR. DULLES: I don't think in intelligence you ought to ever say you do all right. We are doing better, I think, each year.

MR. RASH: Thank you. We will be back with MEET THE PRESS and more questions for our guest, Allen Dulles, in a minute, but first this message.

(Announcement.)

MR. RASH: And now, resuming our interview, our guest today is Mr. Allen W. Dulles, who was Director of the CIA from 1953 until his resignation just a few weeks ago.

You have just met Mr. Lawrence Spivak, our permanent panel member. Our other reporters today are Mr. Wallace Carroll of the New York Times, Mr. John Steele of Time and Life Magazines, and Richard Harkness of NBC News.

We will continue the questions with Mr. Carroll.

MR. CARROLL: Mr. Dulles, at the Communist Party Congress in Moscow last month, some of the disagreements between the Soviets and the Communist Chinese came into the open. Now you have has an exceptional opportunity to study the relationships between these two countries. How deep do you think these disagreements are and what are the underlying causes?

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MR. DULLES: Mr. Carroll, I think these differences run very deep. However, I do not think we should delude ourselves by thinking they run so deeply that there is likely to be an open split between Moscow and Peiping. The basic difference, as you know well, is the difference in approach to their master program of taking over the world. Khrushchev, having repudiated Stalin, and Stalinism, now says it ought to be done under the guise of co-existence. That is, we can take over the world peacefully. The doctrine of Stalin, the Doctrine of Mao, is to the general effect that that is not possible. You've got to be more aggressive, you've got to be more vigorous, you've got to be more ready to use military force, locally at least. This is quite a vital difference and Khrushchev doesn't like it because it affects the image he is trying to create.

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MR. SPIVAK: Mr. Dulles, one of the CIA's jobs is to interpret capabilities and intentions on which foreign governments operate, isn't that true?

MR. DULLES: That is correct, yes.

MR. SPIVAK: Can you tell us now what you see as the Soviet intentions in 1962?

MR. DULLES: Well, I feel quite clear as to Soviet intentions over the longer run than 1962. As I have said before, the Soviet program is to try to take us over, and Khrushchev has indicated that very clearly, Mr. Spivak.

Now as to the shorter run, you are all very well familiar with the areas of crisis. We have Berlin, we have Laos, we have South Viet Nam, we have the Congo, and we have a good many others I could mention.

I believe that they will continue to keep up the pressure in Berlin and then they will try to attack us on the flanks, particularly -- Laos and South Viet Nam and other areas far distant from us.

Berlin will be the focus point and the other areas may well be the areas where they will try to make the immediate progress.

MR. SPIVAK: You say they haven't changed their intentions any and their long-run intentions remain the same, and that is to take us over?

MR. DULLES: That is my view.

MR. SPIVAK: Do they want to take us over physically or do they just want to destroy our power? Do you think they are stupid enough to believe they can conquer this country and hold it and run it, or do they just want to destroy our power?

MR. DULLES: By "take over" I mean, as Khrushchev has clearly said, he believes that our grandchildren will live under a Communist system. I don't mean that they are going to march in with armies. I believe they feel that they can work about a change in our system so that we will, as he indicated, we will adopt a Communist system and like it.

MR. SPIVAK: Can you tell us how you see their military capabilities at the present time, for 1962? There was a time you know when a great many people said by 1962 we would be in serious trouble. Now what

are their capabilities for the immediate future, in your judgment?

MR. DULLES: Well, they are a very strong military power. It is not my view that they intend to precipitate general war because I think as they have themselves said, that that would mean mutual destruction. They are strong on the ground, they have the great land mass from which they could use their military forces. They are highly sophisticated as we must realize, in missiles and they are highly sophisticated in the nuclear field and this last test which was concluded just before I retired, this last test showed that they had made certainly a leap forward in their capability in the nuclear field.

MR. SPIVAK: If their intentions are to destroy us, how is this thing going to end, can we ever live in real peace with them, or must one system or the other in your judgment be destroyed?

MR. DULLES: I think there is hope. I think that with education, if you could get more of an opening up of the Soviet Union, that the Russian people -- I don't think the Russian people have the ambitions that Khrushchev himself has. I think it is quite possible -- it is going to take a long while, it may take decades -- but it is not impossible that the Russian people themselves would force a change in the worldwide ambitions of the Soviet Union.

MR. CARROLL: Mr. Dulles, last spring many officials here in Washington were worried about the spread of Castroism. The influence of Premier Castro in Latin America. Now that indeed was supposed to have been one of the reasons why you and others felt we had to make an attempt to overthrow Castro in Cuba. Has Castro's influence in Latin America grown in the meantime, or was that a miscalculation?

MR. DULLES: I think that Latin America is far more alerted to the danger of Castroism and communism as a danger to their system then they were let's say a year ago, or last April.

Many countries in Latin America have now broken diplomatic relations with Cuba and I think therefore the impact of Castroism has decreased in many Latin American countries over the last six months because of their understanding of what has taken place in Cuba and their apprehension of what might take place in their own countries.

MR. CARROLL: Is it true that the Chinese Communists are very active in Latin America in propaganda against this country?

MR. DULLES: They are quite active, yes.

MR. CARROLL: Do you have evidence?

MR. DULLES: We have some evidence of that and they are also fairly active in Africa.

MR. STEELE: Mr. Dulles, I want to ask you very frankly whether the failure in Cuba was an intelligence failure?

MR. DULLES: I don't think it was, Mr. Steele. There was no military hardware that appeared that was a surprise to us. Some of the material was handled a little better than we expected. There is quite a general popular misapprehension that it was felt that there would be a spontaneous uprising. We have never contemplated that. In the days of the war I worked a great deal with the French underground. The last thing we wanted was spontaneous uprisings, to be slaughtered by the Nazi troops. In the same way we were not looking for a spontaneous uprising, but for other developments.

MR. STEELE: Did we anticipate the appearance of Castro's jets and also the inability of those who reached the beach to get to the mountains when the major objective failed? Were these two things foreseen?

MR. DULLES: There we are getting into areas about which I have not done any talking and I don't think I will start now. Obviously the air situation was a very important element in the whole picture.

MR. STEELE: Mr. Dulles, was the abortive invasion attempt more or less inevitable and did it have perhaps any long-range results on the plus side?

MR. DULLES: Well, looking back at it, Mr. Steele, sort of from the background of history, or as history will look at it, I think the historians of the future will probably say that if any move was to be made to get rid of communism in Cuba short of actual military intervention with all the power of the United States, that effort would probably have to have been made sometime between, say November and April.

MR. RASH: Gentlemen may I say that we have just about two minutes left and if you will keep your questions and answers short accordingly -- Mr. Harkness --

MR. HARKNESS: Quickly on Cuba, Mr. Dulles, I heard after the invasion a military expert say that invasion was the last chance to overthrow Castro without direct United States intervention. Do you agree with that?

MR. DULLES: Well, I wouldn't go quite that far, but I would go well along the line. We knew, as I was just going to say in answer to Mr. Steele, we knew that the Cuban pilots were being trained in Czechoslovakia. We knew they were going to have very shortly available under Cuban direction Migs in considerable numbers and I am inclined to think as I said before, that if a move were to be made short of intervention, probably this was the area of time when it had to be made. About November to April --

MR. HARKNESS: Mr. Dulles, you are always able -- you have to acknowledge your mistakes but you can't boast about your accomplishments in the CIA field. How do you evaluate U. S. Intelligence vis-a-vis, say, the Russians and the British?

MR. DULLES: Well, I think we have a very competent intelligence. I think it has been growing. We have a devoted body of men and women working there. They have worked there for many years. They are now becoming highly competent. We are getting some of the ablest young men in the United States to join with us and I think we have one of the best intelligence services in the world. In the counter-intelligence field we have been doing extremely well this year.

MR. SPIVAK: Mr. Dulles, from time to time it has been suggested that Congress set up a joint watchdog committee over the CIA. What is your opinion of the value and the disadvantages of such a committee?

MR. DULLES: I think the situation as it now exists is pretty good. We have committees, you know. The idea that we are not looked at by Congress is a fantasy. I appeared before a subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee and a subcommittee -- when I was Director -- and a subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee any time they wanted. Those two committees know about all our work, all our activities. We bar no information from them that they want.

MR. RASH: Gentlemen, I am sorry, but I am going to have to suspend our questions at this time.

Thank you very much, Mr. Dulles, for being with us. I will tell you about next week's guest on MEET THE PRESS after this message.

(Announcement)

THE ANNOUNCER: For a printed copy of today's interview send ten cents in coin and a stamped, self-addressed envelope to Merkle Press, 809 Channing Street, N.E., Washington 18, D. C.

MR. RASH: Next Sunday at our regular time MEET THE PRESS will have as its guests the two Republican Congressional leaders, Senator Everett M. Dirksen and Senate Minority Leader, and Congressman Charles O. Halleck, the House Minority Leader.

Next Friday, January the fifth, a special edition of MEET THE PRESS will be presented at 10:30 o'clock Eastern Standard Time. Consult your local television listings for further information.

Now, this is Bryson Rash saying good-bye for Mr. Allen Dulles and MEET THE PRESS.